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Summary 
In modern commercial and military aircraft, 
the Flight Management System (FMS) lies at 
the heart of the functionality of the airplane. 
The nature of the FMS has also caused great 
difficulties learning and accessing this 
functionality. This study examines actual Air 
Force pilots who were qualified on the newly 
introduced advanced FMS and shows that the 
design of the system itself is a primary source 
of difficulty learning the system. 
Twenty representative tasks were selected 
which the pilots could be expected to 
accomplish on an actual flight. These tasks 
. were analyzed using the RAFIV stage model 
(Sherry, Polson, et al. 2002). This analysis 
demonstrates that a great burden is placed on 
remembering complex reformulation of the 
task to function mapping. 65% of the tasks 
required retaining one access steps in memory 
to accomplish the task, 20% required two 
memorized access steps, and 15% required 
zero memorized access steps. The probability 
that a participant would make an access error 
on the tasks was: two memorized access steps - 
74%, one memorized access step - 13%, and 
zero memorized access steps - 6%. Other 
factors were analyzed as well, including 
experience with the system and frequency of 
use. This completed the picture of a system 
with many memorized steps causing difficulty 
with the new system, especially when trying to 
find where to access the correct function. 
Introduction 
This study examines U.S. Air Force pilots 
using an advanced FMS, similar in 
functionality to those in modern commercial 
aircraft. The system had been recently 
introduced, providing an opportunity to 
identify problems associated with learning the 
new system. The FMS and pilot performance 
is examined using the RAFIV stage model 
(Sherry, et al, 2002). The goal of this part of 
the analysis is to show that specific errors can 
be predicted from the design characteristics of 
the system. This study also examines the 
errors that are made while learning a new FMS 
for the first time and shows how patterns of 
error change with increasing experience. 
From these analyses, recommendations are 
made to improve both training and future 
designs. 
First, there is no doubt that the current suite of 
aviation flight management systems provides 
an impressive array of functionality for 
managing an aircraft’s flight. Advances in 
technology have been incorporated into these 
designs allowing precise vertical and lateral 
navigation as well as accurate time control. 
This particular system in this study, the C-130 
Self Contained Navigational System (SCNS), 
allows FMS lateral flight path control, access to 
advanced communication features, internally 
generated approach guidance, iarget time 
control and other sophisticated features. 
These type of systems have been reported to 
be difficult to learn and hard to use (Sarter 
and Woods, 1992; Sherry, et al 2003). The 
major advances in technology have increased 
the functionality of the systems, but 
corresponding advances have not been made 
with the usability of the systems. Similarly, 
advancements in training techniques have not 
been applied to current training programs. 
(Irvine, Polson, and Irvine, 1994) For example, 
training manuals still emphasize long and 
complicated serial lists of memorized actions 
that can be very brittle and easily forgotten by 
the novice user. Anderson (1998) and Polson 
(1999) show more effective methods of 
training complex actions that involve problem 
solving strategies and grouping over list 
memorization. 
It comes as no surprise then that learning the 
glass cockpit for the first time can be 
extremely difficult. ‘What is it doing now’ is 
a phrase familiar to commercial airline pilots 
new to FMS equipped aircraft. Some may 
never master the new skills required for 
operating the computerized flight deck. 
Others may only grasp a few basic survival 
tools that allow them to simply function in the 
perceived complex environment. Even for 
pilots proficient with the basic features, 
potential benefits of unused functionality may 
never be discovered. 
In some situations, poor FMS skills can 
become a potential source difficulty during 
flight operations, even leading to safety of 
flight problems. Forgotten steps or steps 
performed out of sequence can cause 
distraction and confusion which can lead 
inadequate attention to flying the airplane, 
inability to function as an effective crew 
member, loss of situational awareness, or other 
critical issues. For example, an FMS 
programming problem contributed to a loss of 
situational awareness and hull loss on 
approach to Cali, Columbia (AA965 Cali 
Accident Report, 1996). This difficulty 
learning and using flight management systems 
is well documented, for review see Billings 
(1991), Wiener and Nagel (1988). 
What is less well documented and understood 
is why these systems are so cumbersome and 
hard to learn. Much is known about human 
memory and learning, great advances have 
been made in office automation software. This 
knowledge is very applicable to design and 
training issues with the FMS. Taking direction 
from this work, Sherry et a1 (2002) have 
pursued an approach to examining tasks using 
a stage model and then classifying each step as 
requiring recall or supporting exploration. 
The model, RAFIV, contains three basic stages: 
comprehension - reformulating the task into 
FMS functionality; communication - accessing 
the correct feature and entering the 
information; and confirmation - verifying the 
information is correct. The communication 
stage looks at three issues for FMS interaction: 
accessing the correct page, formatting the data 
correctly, and inserting the data in the correct 
location. The verify and monitor stage 
emphasizes looking for feedback in the 
correct location and manner to catch errors 
and ensure the system is performing as 
requested. 
Reformulation is the critical step to enable a 
person to access functionality (Polson, Fennell, 
Sherry, 2003). Reformulation that directly 
links the task to the FMS functionality would 
not require memorization of complex steps or 
relationships. If the reformulation contains 
memorized steps then the task will be harder to 
learn and more likely to be confused or 
forgotten. Since the reformulation contains the 
key to accessing the functionality, the errors 
will be shown in failed or confused access. A 
successful reformulation will direct the task to 
the proper FMS functionality. Reformulate 
and access are inextricably intertwined. A 
complex memorized reformulation will give 
the correct access, but if the access label is 
difficult to remember itself, then the 
reformulate may be troublesome. For 
example, to “activate” the fligbt plan, the 
pilot must reformulate the task into steps 
remembering that this is a NAV feature and 
remembering to push the label called “mode 
ctrl”. The more memorized access steps, the 
more complex the reformulate. 
Insert and format would not contain recall 
steps if the displays simply provided labels and 
defaults. Without this, memorization of recall 
insert and format steps becomes another 
source of difficulty during training. If the 
FMS does contain recall insert andformat 
steps, they may not lie problematic for 
experienced users if the entries are standard, 
consistent, and performed frequently. 
However, non-standard and infrequent recall 
steps may cause difficulty even for 
experienced users. 
Verify Steps are important as a final method 
for trapping an error before it becomes active. 
Verify steps that do not direct the users 
attention to the proper area or are easily 
ignored - such as “automatically” pushing a 
verify button without “true” verification - 
could be troublesome. Proper verification is a 
disciplined approach to using the FMS. A 
device with good feedback on the 
consequences of the action would promote this 
verification. Conversely, simply pushing a 
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verify button that comes up on every task 
without a meaningful relationship to that task 
may be prone to automatic execution without 
actual verification. 
How well have current aircraft fI ight 
management systems been designed according 
to these standards? The data has been clear - a 
large proportion of tasks within these systems 
requires complex reformulation and 
remembering specific information that is not 
supported by the display. Sherry et a1 (2003) 
analyzed the 777 FMS using the RAFIV 
analysis techniques and discovered that 75% 
of the tasks required one or more recall steps 
and of these many were infrequent tasks - 
further aggravating the situation. This study 
applies this model to real world data. It 
examines the FMS itself and looks at the types 
of errors in relation to the predicted problem 
areas of the FMS. In addition, background 
experience data was collected to help 
understand how this may affect learning the 
new system. 
This study examines a unique data set of pilots 
learning a new FMS. The FMS was 
incorporated into an existing airframe, in 
which the pilots were already qualified. 
Twenty Lockheed C- 130 pilots participated; 
all were fully qualified on the new system but 
with different amounts of flight time on the 
newly equipped aircraft. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 24 Air Force Reserve C-130 
Pilots who volunteered to participate in the 
study. Two subjects were not included in any 
statistical analysis due to missing data. 
Subjects who participated gave informed 
consent and were assured of confidentiality of 
identity and personal performance. All 
participants were fully qualified in the use of 
the Self-contained Navigation System. 
Experience ranged from 550 to 8000 hours 
flight time in all aircraft types. Age ranged 
from 25 years to 42 years. The mean age was 
33.9 years with a standard deviation of 4.8 
years. Only male pilots were available. 
Task and Equipment 
The equipment was an actual Self-Contained 
Navigation System used to test components in 
an avionics shop. This equipment was fully 
operational and provided the same 
information as in flight. The setup was 
identical to, and fully interchangeable with, the 
equipment on the C-130 aircraft. 
To accomplish the required tasks, the pilot 
pushed keys on a display unit composed of a 
5" x 5" CRT above an alphanumeric keypad of 
similar dimensions (see figure 1). By pushing 
keys on the keypad, numbers and information 
could be entered and various spftware routines 
could be selected to execute different types of 
tasks. 
The software routines provided different types 
of information and affected the equipment in 
different ways. The TUNE routine controlled 
all radio functions. The TEST routine 
controlled system configuration and status. 
The UPDATE routine updated the software in 
flight. The NAV routine controlled navigation 
functions. The PLAN routine controlled flight 
plan functions. 
Twenty tasks were selected to represent actual 
functions required in flight (see appendix i). 
The tasks were a cross-section of the available 
tasks on the SCNS that might be required 
during flight. Half of the tasks involved the 
TUNE routine since this was a predominant 
SCNS responsibility of the pilots. Four tasks 
involved the PLAN routine. Five tasks 
involved the NAV routine. One task involved 
the TEST routine. Task presentation was 
alternated between routines in a mixed manner 
so no pattern existed for prediction of the 
following task. Table 1 gives one example of 
how a successful task was accomplished. 
3 
i I 
I I 
Line Select 
Menu Keys 
Page 
keys 
Figure 1. Display unit composed of a 5” x 5” CRT above an alphanumeric keypad of similar 
dimensions. 
Table 1. Example Task and Steps 
Acces5 
Format 
Insert 
Verify 
TASK 7 - Tune TACAN to channel 114 
Step 1 
Step 2 
Step 1 
Step 1 
Step 1 
Match the task goal -TUNE - to the TUNE key and press TUNE key 
Recall that the TACAN must be accessed on Navigation Radio page - 
page up until finding this page 
Type 114 into scratch pad 
Insert the contents by pushing TACI label 
Verify that the entry is correct 
Table 2. 
Task Steps per RAFIV stage, total task number = 20 
Access Format Insert Verify Total 
total steps 46 5 16 20 
total recall 21 3 2 1 
avg total steps 2.3 1 1 1 
steps 
avg recall stps 1.05 0.6 0.125 0.05 
NOTE: not all the tasks had format and insert steps. Averages exclude these 
tasks. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked to fill out an informed 
consent form and an experience questionnaire 
upon arrival to the experiment location. The 
experience questionnaire asked pilots to 
record flight time, computer experience, age, 
and types of flight experience. Instructions 
were given at the start of the session about how 
to complete the experiment and how to 
respond to the required tasks. A video camera 
faced the display to record all button presses 
and screen output. Twenty discrete tasks were 
given verbally to each subject. The next task 
was not presented until the previous task was 
completed. The subjects were told to do their 
best to accomplish the tasks without assistance. 
They were informed that assistance would be 
provided when they felt they could not 
proceed further. This enabled all subjects to 
accomplish all tasks. In the actual airplane, 
pilots would be able to ask other crew 
members for assistance or refer to an approved 
in-flight reference if required. 
The experimenter answered questions and 
provided feedback after all twenty tasks had 
been accomplished. Practice on any of the 
tasks followed if desired. The practice focused 
on any areas in which the pilot may have had 
an interest or where the pilot felt below his 
desired performance level. The session lasted 
approximately thirty minutes. 
The videotape was analyzed by frame to 
record all key presses. The key presses were 
then analyzed to determine where they 
deviated from correct procedure. Each 
deviation was scored as an error from one of 
twenty-six types. The errors were then later 
categorized according to the RAFIV stage, 
assist, efficiency, or timing. Assists were 
recorded each time the subject requested 
assistance to accomplish the task. 
Results 
The tasks were first analyzed by using the 
RAFN technique developed by Sherry et al 
(2002). Each of the twenty tasks were divided 
into steps and then classified into RAFIV 
component stages. Each step was then labeled 
as a memorized step (recall) or a step 
supporting exploration (recognition). Some 
tasks required no format or insert stages. 
Overall, the average steps for a task was 4.35, 
with an average of 1.35 of these steps 
requiring memorization. The average steps 
required to access these tasks was 2.35, with 
1.05 of these requiring memorization. Table 2 
shows the steps per task breakdown. 
Each stage in the model was scored as either 
recall or recognition that supported 
exploration. Reformulate, the process of 
translating the task into access steps, 
dominated with the largest percentage of recall 
steps, and as is shown later, will account for 
most of the task critical access errors (see 
figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of tasks containing recall steps. 
$
stem bv RAFN staag 
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Tasks were also given a frequency rating based 
on mission usage. If a task was estimated to be 
performed by the pilot more than once in ten 
missions then it was recorded as frequent. 
65% of the tasks were classified as frequent. 
Error classification 
A total of 467 errors were recorded and sorted 
into twenty-six specific descriptions of the 
actual error. See appendix ii for the error 
descriptions. When the trials were 
administered, the participants tried as best as 
possible to complete the task without 
assistance. The experimenter did not provide 
clues or assistance until requested. It was 
possible that the participant could make more 
than one of the same type of errors for a given 
task. For example, as the participant tried to 
accomplish a task, they may have accessed the 
wrong routine (NAV instead of PLAN) and 
were unable to find the desired task. They may 
have then gone to the correct routine but 
selected the wrong sub-routine or prompt 
I 
from this menu. In this example, both of these 
errors were classified as access errors, even 
though they occurred at different levels within 
the access stage. Errors were classified into the 
following RAFIV categories: access, format, 
insert, and verify or non-RAFnr categories: 
feedbackhiming, efficiency, and assists. . 
Access errors were indicated by selecting the 
wrong routine (key) or searching in the wrong 
routine (115 errors). Since intervention was 
only provided when requested, it was possible 
to make more access errors than access steps in 
a task. We also coded initial accesses errors as 
the inability to access the correct feature on 
the first attempt (1 10 errors). This was useful 
to more accurately compare tasks. 
Format Errors were formatting or typing an 
invalid entry (29 errors). 
Insert Errors were pushing a prompt other 
than the correct insert prompt (25 errors). 
Verify Errors were verifying an incorrect entry 
(1 6 errors). 
Feedback or Timing Errors were errors caused 
by a delay in response from the system (46 
errors). 
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Figure 3. Probability of an access error per task. 
EfSlciency Errors were errors due to a long or 
round about method to accomplish a task (1 3 
errors). 
Assists were indicated where intervention was 
required to accomplish the task (123 errors). 
Average errors per task and average errors per 
task step are shown in table 3. 
Access and Errors 
The strategy for overcoming access problems 
is to effectively reformulate the task to match 
the support provided by the system. Failed 
reformulation will manifest itself directly in an 
access error. 96% of the access errors occurred 
on the tasks that contained recall steps in 
reformulation stage. To examine the effect of 
reformulation on task accomplishment more 
closely, we grouped the tasks into three 
categories, zero memorized steps required for 
access, one memorized step required for 
access, and two memorized steps required for 
access. 
65% of the tasks (n=13) required retaining 
one access steps in memory to accomplish the 
task, 20% ( n 4 )  required two memorized 
access steps, and 15% (n=3) required zero 
’ 
memorized access steps. Thd probability that 
a participant would make an access error on a 
task was: 
two memorized access steps - .74, 
one memorized access step - .13, 
and zero memorized access steps -.06. 
The tasks with zero memorized 
access ’steps (n=3) 
8 total access errors were made, all committed 
on task 3. Of these errors 4 were initial access 
errors. Three of the subjects made only one 
initial access error. Task 3 asked the 
participants to perform a check of the current 
flight plan. Pressing the plan menu key and 
selecting the check flight plan prompt 
accomplished this check. The errors resulted 
from going to the NAV menu key instead of 
the PLAN menu key and were most likely due 
to misapplying the rule “enroute features are 
done using the NAV menu key”. Since it was 
the “Current” flight plan they looked for the 
solution under the NAV menu instead of 
PLAN. Even though there were no 
memorized steps, these participants still made 
an access error by miss applying a 
reformulation correct for another task set. 
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Table 4. 
Access Errors per Recall Steps 
initial access errors 4 37 65 
total access errors 8 47 160 
avg. init. access error/ 0.06 0.13 0.74 
Avg.total access 0.12 0.16 1.82 
task 
errorltask I 
These tasks made up 15% of the tasks and 
accounted for 4% of the access errors. The 
probability that an access error would be made 
on one of these tasks was .06. 
The tasks with one memorized 
access step (n=13) ' 
47 total access errors were made. Of these, 37 
were initial access errors. 
2 tasks had zero access errors even though 
they required one memorized access step. This 
was explained by the fact that these two tasks 
were very frequent and therefore practice or 
use had overcome the access problems. 
These tasks made up 65% of total tasks and 
accounted for 22% of access errors. The 
probability of making an access error on one 
of these tasks was .13. 
The tasks with 2 memorized access 
steps (n=4) 
extensively. These 4 tasks made up 20% of 
total tasks and accounted for 74% of access 
errors. The probability of a pirbt making an 
access error on one of these tasks was .74. The 
pilots also performed these complex tasks 
more infrequently than the others due to the 
nature of the particular flight environment. 
Format, Insert, Verify and Errors 
Overall, these errors were much less common 
than access errors, accounting for 14% of the 
total errors (n= 70). However, the errors 
primarily occurred on tasks where memory 
steps were required for the related stage. 
93% of the format errors occurred on the tasks 
that required remembering how to format the 
entry, as opposed to following a label or 
mimicking default format entry. 
80% of the insert errors occurred on the tasks 
that did not have good labeling support and 
required remembering difficult or problematic 
labels. 
160 total access errors were observed. Of these, 
65 were initial access errors. The subjects were 
allowed to continue to search for the correct 
feature until assistance was requested and this 
shows that access remained problematic even 
after searching for the correct feature 
81% of the verify errors occurred on tasks that 
required directing attention to an unexpected 
error but did not provide direct feedback for 
that task. Specifically, these errors occurred 
when a verification prompt was pushed for an 
incorrect entry but the verification prompt 
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Figure 4. Total errors. 
failed to properly direct attention or highlight 
the error. 
The effect of experience on errors 
All pilots were relatively new to this system 
with less than a year of experience. Recent 
flight time with the new system, the measure of 
experience with the new system, varied from 
25 hours to 200 hours. The average flight 
time was 96 hours with a standard deviation of 
62 hours. 
As experience increased with the new system, 
total errors decreased, _r (22) = -.42, p = .025 
(see figure 4).. Likewise, relative expertise on 
the new system was negatively correlated with 
knowledge type errors or ability to accomplish 
the task correctly and without assistance, _r (22) 
= -.61, p=.OOl (see figure 4). 
A few of the test condition tasks required 
altered data entry and verification from the 
most commonly used tasks. Errors or slips 
associated with these type of tasks increased as 
a function of relative expertise on the new 
system,_r (22) = .44, p = .02 (see figure 5). 
An interesting observation was made about 
various other types of background experience 
including flight time on the previms system, 
age, and time spent using personal computers. 
While age did predict previous flight time and 
computer experience, it did not predict error 
rate. Computer experience by itself was a 
significant predictor for decreased errors, _r 
(22) = -.43, p =.02. This is possibly 
explained by frequent computer users needing 
to develop a strategy for accessing computer 
functions. This strategy may have transferred 
allowing the pilot to more quickly develop 
access skills with the aircraft Flight 
Management Computer. For example, if the 
pilots correlated the FMC routine access keys 
to computer program menu prompts, then an 
already learned search and access strategy 
could be applied to the new system. 
Finally, Errors associated with timing of tasks 
and display feedback decreased as a function 
of relative expertise,_r (22) = -. 37, p = .04 
(see figure 6). 
Discussion 
This data clearly presents recall steps as a root 
cause for difficulty learning a new FMS. 
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Figure 5. Task Accomplishment Errors. 
Recall steps in reformulating or mapping the 
task to automation function have a devastating 
effect on task accomplishment. Tasks with 2 
memorized access steps had the probability of 
.74 for committing an access error. This is 
compared to .13 for one memorized step and 
.06 for no memorized steps. Clearly the recall 
steps of this design have very negative impact 
on access and performance of the task. 
68% of the task accomplishment errors 
occurred on tasks that were both infrequent 
and contained recall steps in the reformulation 
stage. This highlights the importance of 
analyzing frequency in both design and 
training. 
Slips and skill-based errors did not have nearly 
as large of an impact on performance with this 
system, accounting for 19% of the total errors. 
Of these, 13% were associated with timing and 
feedback and were not affected by recall steps. 
6% were associated with data entry slips. 
These were greatly affected by recall steps in 
the format stage, accounting for 93% of these 
errors. Also of note, these slips increased with 
experience on the new system, countering the 
trend for other errors to decrease with 
experience. 
I 
Impact on Design 
Errors are clearly impacted by design. Based 
on these findings, a design should support the 
reformulate and access stage directly with 
salient labels and easy access. Frequent tasks 
might not need as much support as infrequent 
tasks and could be designed for ease and 
quickness of task execution, while infrequent 
tasks require direct and clear support. A 
complete task analysis is important for 
determining both system functions as well as 
for task frequency to ensure the task is 
supported properly. 
Consistent feedback from the displays, 
prompting or examples for format, and good 
labels for insert all are important for use, but 
are not as critical to successful use as 
reformulate and access. Users quickly learn 
from feedback how to work within the system. 
Even though problems with data entry are 
difficult to overcome, these slips did not have a 
huge impact on performance, only accounting 
for 6% of the total errors. Still, a design 
following the RAFIV principles should 
eliminate these slips altogether. 
Impact on Training 
Since it is not possible to redesign all current 
systems, training becomes paramount. Current 
training programs do not adequately give 
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Figure 6. SLIPS associated with data entry / format, or “automatic” verification. 
pilots the resources needed to effectively 
utilize these systems. Manuals still present 
many of the tasks as a serial list of memorized 
actions, easily forgotten and brittle causing 
frustration during training and line operations 
Effective training should start with a thorough 
analysis of the tasks, looking for recall steps 
and task commonality. A modification of 
RAFIV (Sherry, et a1 2002) for teaching would 
simplify this model into key problem areas 
identified by this study, reformulating Access, 
Entry, and Verification (AEV). First, train 
access by providing the context, relationships, 
and devices needed to reformulate the task 
into FMS functionality. The skill of effective 
reformulation is the essential key to 
functionality and should be the key to 
training.. Teaching the reformulation of 
access steps through mnemonic devices, 
commonality, and frequency is one approach. 
The importance of this is that the trainee needs 
a good understanding of how to access the 
desired feature long after the training is 
complete. Where difficult memory steps are 
identified, powerful memory aides must be 
implemented. For example, instructors have 
used the acronym DIFFUPPs as a device to 
help pilots remember the complex access steps 
in pre-flighting the A-320 FMS. The next key 
is proper Entry. This encompasses format and 
insert and for most tasks on adyanced 
airplanes can be taught as one step since FMS 
support is usually adequate. Format and insert 
errors in this study were not numerous, even 
when tasks were improperly supported with 
recall items. Training format and insert as a 
single category would likely reduce the 
trainee’s workload as well provide a simpler 
tool for the instructor. The last step, Verify, in 
some ways is as important as access. It is the 
last step before allowing a mistake to become 
active. Good verification skills will overcome 
liabilities of the FMS as well as the human and 
hopefully prevent catastrophic errors such as 
the Cali accident. Training where to look 
during verification and reminders to maintain 
vigilance when the verification step becomes 
highly automated are crucial. 
Tasks can be grouped by function or by 
design consistency. Tasks can then be taught 
by family to reduce the number of memorized 
steps. Important recall steps can be identified 
and memory devices emphasized for these 
steps. For example, when teaching how to 
perform a course intercept on the Boeing 777, 
several tasks - such as runway extension, radial 
interception, airway interception - all can be 
grouped as a common type of access task to 
reduce the number of memorized tasks and 
steps. Enough repetitions must be performed 
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during training to solidify learning, especially 
for infrequent tasks. 
Mission critical infrequent tasks especially 
need to be repeated or practiced even after 
training. For example, the need to use VNAV 
guidance on the Boeing 777 for an engine 
failure at cruise altitude does not occur 
frequently in line operations, but proper 
execution is critical when required. These 
tasks can be identified with this type of . 
analysis and tools given for practice on the 
line. Some examples would be web-based 
trainers, recurrent simulator training, mental 
“chair flying” exercises, part task trainers, etc. 
For example, many pilots have made use of 
“chair flying exercises” to practice complex 
procedures when no high fidelity device is 
available. The pilot mentally and verbally 
practices each step in a procedure as if he were 
actually in the airplane. This allows the pilot to 
reinforce complex memorized action. The 
type of task will drive optimum fidelity for 
practice. A full motion simulator is essential 
for actual landing practice, but this motion can 
be a distraction during FMS training. Realistic 
feedback with adequate repetition on an FMS 
trainer is important, but additional repetition 
with guided “chair-flying” exercises may be 
an effective way to increase repetitions while 
studying when no better practice device is 
available. 
The evidence for general computer experience 
positively affecting performance on this 
system is further argument for teaching robust 
skills for managing these systems. The 
development of these types of skills may allow 
the user to deal with unusual situations, 
interruptions or distractions, or slightly altered 
or modified tasks. 
Conclusion 
This study shows the effectiveness of the 
RAFIV analysis as a tool for evaluating areas 
of usage difficulty within a system. Recall 
steps by stage very effectively analyze 
performance deficits associated with the 
system itself. 
Since the Hight Management System lies at 
the heart of the functionality of the airplane, 
improvements need to be made in design and 
training to access the potential benefits this 
functionality provides. It is the very nature of 
the current FMS that has caused the great 
difficulties learning and accessing this 
functionality. Future designs should take into 
this into account to reduce traidng costs as 
well as increase efficiency of use. Without a 
proper design, proper training is extremely 
critical. Without this training, the functionality 
will continue to be underutilized and training 
will continue to be perceived as extremely 
difficult. 
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Appendix i 
Tasks and their associated Droaram function. 
The tune tasks were: 
turn on communication radios, 
turn on navigation radios, 
tune TACAN to channel 114, 
tune UHF to channel 6, 
turn off UHF squelch, 
tune VHF to 124.0, 
put HFI to maximum squelch, 
turn on UHF1 squelch, 
turn HFI squelch off, 
turn off communication radios then 
navigation radios. 
The NAV tasks were: 
put INS in NAV mode, 
turn flight plan on, 
go to page with outside air 
temperature, 
go to airdrop page, 
sequence flight mode between 
I 
waypoint 3 
and waypoint 4. 
The PLAN tasks were: 
check flight plan, 
delete waypoint 9, 
insert waypojnt 9 after 6, 
check flight history. 
The TEST tusk wus: go to the SCNS output 
test page. 
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